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March 5(?)

Specific arrangements suggested for inclusion in operational framework
for coordinated U.S.-British operations with Russian emigre groups.

SUBJECT

FROM

TO

DATE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SECRET

13-00000-00000-00000

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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1. Each service recognizes the right of the other to exploit any Russian emigre group for the purpose of conducting intelligence operations. Both services recognize the need for coordination of their efforts to exploit the same group. Both accept as basic the principle that neither will attempt to exploit agents or networks controlled by the other.

2. Discussions of group operations will be initiated on the London-Washington level. Discussion of operational matters relating to any group which involve basic questions of foreign policy will be discussed only at the Washington-London level. Discussion of other operational matters may be accomplished through field conferences called to deal with specific problems. Such working-level discussion, however, will require specific authorization after London-Washington agreement on each case.

3. Informal interpretations of U.S. and British foreign policy passed by the respective services to leading members of Russian emigre groups will be discussed beforehand at the London-Washington level and insofar as possible harmonized.

4. A continuing effort will be made by both services to control and monitor as closely as practicable all political communications transmitted to resistance groups within the USSR by Russian emigre groups operating in collaboration with either service. Each service will inform the other of the content of all such communications.

5. When either service selects from the membership of any Russian emigre group with which both are in operational contact an agent candidate for an operational mission into the USSR. and when there is any indication that the candidate has previously had contact with the other service, the name and other data needed for identification purposes will be passed to the other service

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with a statement that the individual is being considered for such a mission and an invitation to communicate any interview which it may wish to have considered in that connection. The other service, if it should wish to claim continued jurisdiction over the individual concerned, may then request that recruitment of the candidate be reconsidered, supporting that request by a statement of the factual basis for its claim. If it does not wish to make such a claim, it will, within the limits of operational security, furnish any information it may have relating to the individual concerned. All such exchanges will be conducted at the London-Washington level unless specifically authorized otherwise.

6. Exchange of operational intelligence information resulting from six missions into the USSR. will continue to be exchanged as at present at the London-Washington level.

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UNR

Undoubtedly the British feel that the UNR is a truer expression of Eastern Ukrainian politics than either the ZPUHVR or OUN/B which at least in background have a decidedly Galician tinge. That is the first point. Secondly, the UNR traditionally gets along well with the Poles, who cannot get along well with OUN/B and the ZPUHVR because of a basic disagreement over the relatively academic question of who will own post-World War III Galicia. The Poles cite history and the Galician Ukrainians recite population statistics. The Eastern Ukrainians are, however, ready to swap Galicia which they value lightly for Polish and, through Polish, British support which, by default of any other, they value highly. Even though the British were unable to make good their guarantee of a free Poland, the working arrangement with the traditionally anti-Russian elements of the Polish emigre IS undoubtedly remains the same: the Poles are the cutouts at least for the exploratory stages of ~~such an~~ ^{several Eastern European} operations. This is quite ~~and~~ in keeping with the best traditions of the BIS. The Poles for their part must be quite pleased to reacquire that which they had between the first two Wars, namely, a Ukrainian exile government in their anteroom. Were it not for the overriding problem posed by the omnipresence of the Bolshevik regime, there is little doubt but what the Poles would like to see Ukrainian nationalist activity in Eastern Galicia subside into peaceful oblivion.

What the British and by extension the Poles intend to do with the UNR is not quite certain, because by an oversight for which the undersigned must take the main credit we have no highly-placed source in the UNR nor do we have an in with the London Poles. The following are probable or at least possible lines of current endeavor:

- a. the UNR will transfer itself bodily to England, (probable)

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- b. Recently-promoted General Ivan KOVA~~l~~ and unjustly-famous Col. BOROVETS alias Taras BULBA play a dominant role in the operation because they control the Ukrainian National Guard (UNG) the only UNR recruiting pool from which young men willing to return to the Ukraine can be picked. (probable)
- c. By some means the British are supporting two of the UNR publications Soborna Ukraina and Ukrainski Visti. (probable)
- d. The British hope that the predominantly Galician emigre groups will have to mesh or at least come to favorable terms with the UNR if the latter can produce a persuasive proof that non-UHVR-OUN-UPA resistance exists in the Eastern Ukraine or that the UNR is gaining or has popularity there. (possible)
- e. The British have bought the UNR suggestion of organizing by long-distance an underground in the Eastern Ukraine. (possible)
- f. The British have UNR or UNG personnel in training for dispatch this spring. (probable)
- g. The British-trained UNG personnel will travel overland through Poland using previously established Polish lines until the USSR border. (probable)
- h. The British-dispatched personnel will try to contact the UHVR and bargain on the basis of British support in exchange for partial recognition of the UNR. (possible)
- i. The British will not operate UNR personnel into the UHVR-UPA*OUN headquarters but will by-pass it and attempt to organize various areas in the East. (possible)
- j. The British are interested only in intelligence procurement but have had to play politics re organizing nationalist cells in order

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to get UNR recruits in the first place and develop internal support points in the second. (probable)

- k. The British are interested only in singletons or doubletons and have only conceded to allow subsidiary cell-building in the name of the UNR as an unavoidable necessity. (possible)
- l. The British recognize the relative impossibility of starting a resistance movement from scratch in the present Ukrainian SSR conditions and merely hope to establish many singletons with inactive radio sets in the Eastern Ukraine against the day of the next war's outbreak. (possible)
- m. The British realize that the UNR has no real peacetime operation potential except as a recruitment pool for a few hurry-up infiltrations of bodies this spring and summer but at the same time the British feel that the AIS would be willing to grant full partnership in the ZPUHVR operation in exchange for the British removal of support from the UNR and the OUN/B following the dispatch of the couriers the British now have in training. (possible)
- n. The British see deficiencies in the UNR as a long range asset, but are merely using it as a bargaining pawn for the London discussion. (only slightly possible)
- o. The British may request the AIS to support them in their UNR operation with an offer of full partnership in exchange for BGRHYTHM type support of the operation in the Ukraine. (possible)
- p. The British may be wooing what they earnestly feel to be the emigre group which will be the most significant force after the next war is underway. This would presuppose that a separate, essentially

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Eastern Ukrainian uprising would take place to which the UNR rather than UHVR-UPA-OUN would have more appeal. (possible)

- q. The British may have arranged things so far so that the UNR operation for all intents and purposes is tied up only with the London Poles to any traceable degree; they may deny that they have a UNR or UNG operation preferring to keep this one as much as possible out of our London discussions; perhaps they intend to buy the UNR only if the Poles get some good results from the first dispatch operations. (possible)
- r. The British have latched onto Gen. Ivan ~~KOVAL~~^K's operational plan (once presented without result to Sgt. Randolph Carroll of CIC and MIS, Germany) and merely intend to furnish a few operational supplies such as documentation and arms, while allowing KOVAL to do his own recruiting, training and dispatch. (possible)

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Whether the British are toying with OUN/B for bargaining purposes or not, we have to assume on the basis of their performance to date that they are preparing to help dispatch OUN/B couriers to UHVR-UPA-OUN headquarters this spring. Such a dispatch at this time runs directly counter to our operational interests for the following among other reasons:

- a. the continued uncoordinated dispatch of a plurality of uncoordinated courier teams from different organizations is a security hazard for the underground as well as our own operation.
- b. any Bandera team going in this spring will most certainly carry an anti-American and anti-ZPUHVR briefing which, taken together with the opaque political briefing re nationalist aspirations we are in a position to give plus the VOA broadcasts, may cause grave mistrust as to: Western motives, ^{extent} cooperation between Americans and English, the logic of ZPUHVR's cooperation with us, the logic risking further ~~non-entire~~ ^{underground} courier personnel to get merely material support the delivery of which may cost more lives through security compromises than it is worth under the present situation, etc.
- c. the underground may develop the idea that the British and Americans are fostering the conflict for some obscure motives of individual self-interest or foreign policy and that each is merely trying to use the underground on the basis of intelligence reports for non-political support.
- d. since the Ukrainian underground is reasonably sure it will get some material support from abroad merely on its military merits during the next war, it has insisted upon putting political understanding before all else and will of course be very dis-

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appointed with the results achieved by CARTHAGE 3's
spectacular mission; couriers from other groups backed
by other nations which have given different political
briefing can only discredit further the position of the
United States.

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